

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: SPECIAL AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. MOX-W-2535

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

TO :

DATE: 28 July 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

SUBJECT: Chief, JEM
GENERAL

Attn. Pullach

SPECIFIC

Constantine PAPANACE and Malle LEFTER

REF: MUNI 545, MOX-A-2401

1. In January 1941, following Iron Guard rioting in Bucharest, Alfred Otto von BOLSCHWING, subject of MOX-A-2401, supported the establishment of Hora SINA and twelve other Iron Guard leaders in an SS recreation camp at Fuerstenwald. Among these individuals was Constantine PAPANACE, also spelled PAPIPAGE. PAPANACE later accused SINA of being too moderate and indecisive in his leadership of Iron Guard elements in Germany. PAPANACE, together with GABRIELA (fma), another Iron Guardist, formed an anti-SINA group which was known as the Mexicanii. The total strength of the Mexicanii was about seventy. Members of the group are now found for the most part in Germany and Italy, though some of them returned to Rumania and joined the Communist Party.

2. A LEFTER (fma), probably identical with the Malle LEFTER in the reference cable, was a member of the Mexicanii group in Germany. His position and influence within the Mexicanii is unknown. In December 1948, a Professor LEFTER (fma), (probably identical with Malle LEFTER) a former Iron Guardist and member of the COMRADEU (Mexicanii) group, attended the International Congress for the Study of Monarchic Problems held in Rome. In a speech Professor LEFTER expressed the loyalty of the remnants of the Iron Guard to the Monarchist cause in Rumania.

3. There is nothing available in our files on the activities of LEFTER and PAPANACE during their internment in Germany or since the war. It is not apparent why BOLSCHWING contacted LEFTER and PAPANACE in Rome in July 1948. Will you please clarify the status of LEFTER and PAPANACE vis a vis COMRADEU.

EP:js 2 2

RECORDED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Opera

Richard Helms

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

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E X T R A C T

MGLA-535

7 October 1949

During TRAJAN's two trips to Rumania in 1947 and 1948 he contacted the leaders of the Rumanian group PAPANACE/GROZEA intending to interest them in intelligence work for CDEUM. He had no success during his first visit during the winter of 1947/48 and it was only later after lengthy conversations during his second trip that he was able to convince these men that their duty and advantage lay in helping the West to form as accurate as possible a picture of Rumania.

The following description of this Rumanian group was submitted with this project:

Until 1946 the various political parties in Rumania were primarily interested in their party politics. Later traditional party interests were subordinated to the overall national interest. Two factors brought this about: the increasing Communist pressure limited party activities, and it was realized that no western support for the democratic parties could be expected in the foreseeable future. This development led to a rapprochement of the best forces of the different parties and out of their conferences came what they consider the most promising tactics to combat the Soviet plan to bolshevise Rumania for political and military reasons. They decided to remain in the country to work for the democratic future, but not to sacrifice lives in a futile effort to actively oppose the Communists. Instead they determined to carry out these steps: Phase #1. Infiltration of the Communist Party, in particular the youth and labor elements in order to keep contact with the masses and, above all, to influence those party members who joined only to insure their existence. This phase has been completed. Phase #2. Infiltration of the army in anticipation of a possible war. Conversations which VISCHINSKI had with authorities of the Rumanian Army from 29 April to 1 May 1948 in which it was decided that the Rumanian Army in case of war would be split up into small contingents assigned to Soviet units outside of Rumania, gave this infiltration plan great impetus when it became known. Small cadres were built in the Rumanian Army whose task it would be in the event of war to arrange for the defection of Rumanian units as soon as they had a common front with Western troops. Phase #3. If Russia should decide to withdraw from Rumania of her own accord (a solution which is highly improbable, but must be taken into consideration) the Nationalist elements which have managed to infiltrate the Communist ranks would, at least at first, be in a position to take necessary action against the Communist leadership and preserve order.

The PAPANACE/GROZEA group resolved to observe the following tactical rules: complete separation from any active resistance elements, from various groups in exile in the West, and from any contact with western agents operation inside Rumania. They also resolved to have no contact with any western missions in Rumania. TRAJAN was able to convince the leaders of this group that they must establish contact with western intelligence agents if they were to enable the West to plan with counter moves to the Soviet offensive. The Rumanian group insisted on several security measures to

be followed, including a complete separation of the intelligence part of the show from their regularly functioning elements, the gradual and step-by-step erection of the structure starting in the western areas of Rumania and gradually embracing the entire state. TRAJAN talked over details of this plan with group leaders of the PAPANACE/GROZEA movement during his second trip to Rumania in the autumn of 1948. A three-group system (Dreiergruppen-System) was decided on. TRAJAN met the regional leaders separately to arrange this, gave them written instructions and taught them secret ink systems and other details of intelligence work.

This broad basis provided by this PAPANACE/GROZEA group offers an unlimited possibility for expansion of this information service.